



RESEARCH ARTICLE

Lecturers' Resistance to Religious Moderation Policy in Handling Radicalism: Evidence from State Islamic University of Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, Indonesia

Muhammad Syaifuddin^{1*}, Miftahuddin², M. Fahli Zatra Hadi³, Riki Rahman⁴

^{1,2,3}Department of Islamic Education Management, Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, Pekanbaru, Riau, Indonesia

⁴Department of Social Science, Univ Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, Parit Raja, Batu Pahat, Johor, Malaysia

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: May 11, 2024 Accepted: Aug 28, 2024	<p>The Indonesian State Intelligence Agency in 2018 revealed that seven state universities in Indonesia were exposed to radicalism. This situation can endanger the security and the harmony of the country. Based on this fact, this study aims to discuss the forms, factors, and effects of lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. The primary data of this research is an interview with lecturers and university leaders. The main document such as Semester Lesson Plan is a part of primary data as well. The interviews were conducted directly (meeting) and indirectly (mobile connection) to obtain information. The collected data is then analyzed using the interpretation analysis method. Meanwhile, the secondary data comes in the form of online media documentation related to the involvement that is indicated to reject the religious moderation policy. The results show that there are two main ways that resistance among lecturers appears: open resistance and closed resistance. Open resistance refers to overt acts and remarks that oppose Islamic moderation, such as support for groups like as the caliphate and hate speech. Passive protests and policy non-compliance are examples of less obvious forms of opposition that are part of the closed resistance. These resistances were influenced by cultural factors, including high levels of spiritualism, and structural factors, such as the integration of government regulations that were perceived as inconsistent with the lecturers' beliefs. This research highlights the complexity of implementing top-down policies in environments where underlying beliefs and structures do not align with the policy's goals. This research suggests to conduct long-term studies to understand how resistance to religious moderation policies evolves over time. In addition, comparative studies of other countries can also be done to understand how different cultural and structural factors influence the success or failure of such policies.</p>
<p>Keywords</p> Resistance Intolerant Cultural factor Structural factor Radicalism University	
<p>*Corresponding Author: muhamadsyaifuddin74@gmail.com</p>	

INTRODUCTION

In the last three years, radicalism and religion-based intolerance in Indonesia keep escalating. This condition is indicated by rampant acts of discrimination against religious minorities and an upsurge in radical groups attempting to push their agendas into the public sphere. According to SETARA Institute, the number of violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia in 2022 was 175,

with 333 actions. This number escalated from 318 actions in 2021 (Detik News, 2023). Ironically, schools and universities, which become the key instruments in the development of the nation's civilization, cannot escape the infiltration of radicalism and its movements. The findings of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) revealed that seven state universities in Indonesia were exposed to radicalism, and there were indications of lecturers' involvement in the movement opposing The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), campaigning for a caliphate, spreading hoaxes and hatred, and persecuting other people in the public sphere. Hence, all parties must respond to this issue. The spokesman for the Head of the State Intelligence Agency, Wawan Hari Purwanto, confirmed that indeed there were seven state universities exposed to radicalism. According to Wawan, the findings of the 2018 development also revealed that 39 percent of students in 15 provinces showed their interest in radicalism. He explained that students' interest in radicalism was categorized into three levels, namely low, medium, and high (Kompas, 2018). Radicalism and intolerance enter educational institutions in various ways, including the religious extracurricular activities and alumni affiliated with radical movements.

Based on several studies that have shown this fact, the Indonesian Ministry of Religion has issued a new policy, namely the moderation of religious life. It is distinctive in a uniqueness dimension of a nation and time, specifically the present. The policy of moderation can be comprehended as a form of national concern regarding the future direction of religiosity. It is very serious because we have decided to make all Indonesian citizens religious. In the midst of its plurality, religious life needs an appropriate policy foundation. The Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, emphasized his determination in implementing the program to enhance religious moderation. Apart from being included in the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan, religious moderation also becomes a special mandate assigned to him by President Joko Widodo (Kemenag, 2021). The policy received various responses from the lecturers. Some support it, and some reject it. The rejection of the religious moderation policy by lecturers is considered not just as an individual and institutional problem but also as a shift in the basic understanding that occurs in lecturers. This shift in understanding is in line with the incorporation of global values, which provide a new way of life in the form of freedom in responding to government policies. The measure of freedom taken tends to be based on human rights. Changes induced by globalization have become a significant setting that structures lecturers' mindsets.

In the perspective of the study, so far, the resistance of lecturers to religious moderation policy in Indonesia can be observed from two perspectives, namely individuals and institutions. The first tendency or those linked to individuals are the studies on lecturers' involvement in radicalism movement in Indonesia, specifically indications of lecturers' involvement in the movement opposing The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, campaigning for the caliphate, spreading false and hateful news, and persecuting others in public spaces (Muhammad Nasir, 2019). In addition, the data shows that 87.89 percent of teachers and lecturers agree if the government prohibits the existence of minority groups that are deemed to deviate from Islamic teachings (Saputra, 2018). The second tendency or those linked to institutions is the fact that ten well-known state universities in Indonesia have been exposed to radicalism (Murtadlo, 2019). Furthermore, the potential of radical understanding establishment among students is strongly influenced by the interactions with the organizational network outside the campus that adhere to radicalism (Basri & Dwiningrum, 2019).

Several studies on radicalism and religious moderation policies in Indonesia have been found. Afwadzi et.al (2024) focuses on how students at UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, an Islamic university, understand and apply religious moderation through their interpretation of Qur'anic verses and hadith. The study argues for the importance of using religious texts to promote moderation among Islamic university students in Indonesia, highlighting the potential of this approach to reduce radicalism and intolerance. Ma'arif et.al (2024) study on high levels of religious intolerance among students, with 30-50% of them showing signs of intolerance. The authors

emphasize the need for alternative learning models to combat prejudice and intolerance. Their aim is to create a communication-based educational model grounded in Qur'anic religious pluralism to prevent religious prejudice and promote religious moderation. The finding shows that educational model proved effective in reducing religious prejudice and increasing moderation among Muslim students. After the intervention, students showed more tolerance, with a significant decrease in negative religious prejudices.

Nurrohim et al (2024) concludes that while both interpretations contribute significantly to the discourse on Islamic moderation in Indonesia, a more comprehensive approach that combines their strengths could better promote religious tolerance and unity in the country. Noviani et al (2024) concludes that religious moderation is essential for achieving harmony but must be implemented with sensitivity to the diverse contexts within the community. They find that religious moderation is generally viewed as a positive force that can enhance tolerance and unity among different religious communities in the region. Noviani emphasizes the importance of dialogue between different religious groups to reduce tensions and promote a stable, harmonious society. Syatar et al (2024) finds that students generally had a positive view of religious moderation, with strong support for national commitment and non-violence as foundations for tolerance. However, there was a significant portion of students who lacked a proper understanding of religious moderation, which could make them vulnerable to radical ideologies. Syatar emphasizes that strengthening religious moderation in universities is essential for countering radical and intolerant ideologies. The study highlights the need for ongoing efforts to educate students and promote a balanced understanding of religion in a multicultural society.

Based on the previous studies above, it appears that research on lecturers' resistance to religious moderation in handling radicalism in Indonesia has not been done yet. Meanwhile, the lecturers' subjective perspective is ignored in the existing researches. Therefore, the study on Lecturers' Resistance to Religious Moderation Policy in Handling Radicalism is very important because it has not yet been conducted by scholars in Indonesia. Such research appears to have the potential to be further explored by other researchers in the future. Thus, this study will discuss how the lecturers justify their resistance to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. The objective of this study is to explain the extent of the resistance of lecturers to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. In accordance with this objective, three questions are posed. First, what are the forms of rejection to religious moderation policy? Second, what are the factors that contribute to the rejection? Third, how does the rejection of the lecturers affect the efforts to develop a moderate university?

Theoretical frameworks

Radicalism

Radicalism is derived from the Latin word *radix*, which means "root" (Tamtanus, 2018). Radicalism movement is an attitude that leads an individual to an act of changing and undermining pre-existing ideas or understandings (Hafid, 2020). Radicalism is also regarded as a narrow-minded and excessive spirit movement since it prioritizes violent means in accomplishing its goals (Wahid, 2018). Besides, radicalism is always associated with two understandings, namely religious and political understanding. The radicalism of religious understanding is caused by the understanding that revelation can only be understood literally in line with what is documented in the scriptures, resulting in a narrow fanaticism on a belief that is only based on a single truth in the scriptures (Damanik & Ndonga, 2020; Kurniawan, 2020). Meanwhile, political radicalism cannot be separated from the idealistic path for political mobilization and reconstruction (Zheng, 2015; Fodeman et al. 2020). The two understandings of radicalism associated with religious and political understandings above are often considered as a set of illegal practices and strategies because they fall beyond the boundaries of religious or political protest (Cross & Snow, 2011).

Radicalism, which often perceived as illegal, has led to a lot of criticism and rebellion (Trehearne, 2018). Radicalism is considered as a disruptor of the social system since it aims to destroy the existing balance to achieve the desired changes to occur (Cao, 2017). Changes or reforms implemented by radicalism have implications to cause tensions by eliciting criticism and rebellion from people in their surroundings who oppose these changes (Silver, 2018). Meanwhile, the radicals are basically engaged in several activities, including (1) making mosques, prayer rooms, campuses, and student boarding houses as the basis for the movement of a number of Islamic fundamentalism organizations, with these places serving as centers of study, indoctrination, recruitment, and mobilization of radical Islam through *halaqa*, *usrah*, or *daurah* programs, (2) enforcing the Islamization of public spaces, as well as being a "security apparatus" for people who, in their perspective, violate "religious norms", (3) establishing websites, social media accounts, online portals, and intentionally Islamic-based publications designed to propagate violent ideologies, hate speech, the establishment of Islamic state, and blasphemy against Western products (Muthohirin, 2015).

Moderation Policy

The concept of moderation in religion has a broad spectrum. Moderation is defined as something between two opposite things or extremes (Ushama, 2014). Moderation is defined as a moderate religious understanding and practice that falls somewhere (middle way) between the right and left extreme (Arif, 2020). Religious moderation, which literally means "being in the between of two opposites or extremes," shows the acceptance, openness, and synergy of different religious groups. This is in line with the concept of moderation in Tezcur's perspective, which is perceived as a public adaptation, peace, and non-confrontation strategy that seeks a peaceful compromise by avoiding provocative and confrontational strategies that involve violence (Brocker & Künkler, 2013). This demonstrates that the most fundamental form of moderation is as a middle way in dealing with differences in both extreme and fundamental groups (Sutrisno, 2019). Thus, a correct understanding of religious moderation will be able to stabilize oneself in comprehending a text of religious norms without going overboard (Iffan et al. 2020).

The discourse regarding religious moderation emerges as a response to the numerous intolerance and radicalism movements that arose in the name of religion (Zafi, 2020). This is in line with Hidayat et al. (2020) opinion, which state that, at the policy level, moderation has become a strategic effort to prevent radicalism. Religious moderation can be strengthened by interacting across religions and sects within the internal religious community as much as possible (Sutrisno, 2019). Meanwhile, religious moderation form includes acknowledging the existence of other parties, being tolerant, respecting different views, and not forcing one's will by violence (Akhmadi, 2019). Moderation understanding will encourage a balanced religious attitude between practicing one's own religion and respecting the religious practices of others who have different beliefs. Thus, moderation will develop an attitude of not shutting oneself, of not being exclusive or closed, but of being open and willing to adapt (Irawan, 2020).

Resistance

Resistance is defined by James C. Scott as a response to a change in an individual's life, particularly when the individual is under pressure, so that the reaction takes the form of rejection and support from social groups (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013). Resistance is described as opportunities or adaptations of powerless groups to openly oppose the existing power structure in order to protect their interests and identities. Resistance is also defined as a form of dissatisfaction with dominance (Factor et al. 2011). Therefore, resistance is related to vulnerable group or people who have lost their rights (Al-Rawi, 2016). According to Junor, O'Brien, and O'Donnell, collective resistance is frequently applied on social movements that oppose the behavior and structural strength through opposition acts and behaviors, such as protest, dissent, rebellion, strike, work restrictions, and absence (Aly,

2013). These forms of resistance will lead to decision-making in community groups to obtain the same results and access in social interactions (Currás & Sastre, 2020).

In the context of radicalism, which are often viewed as an instrument of counter-hegemonic movement, radicalism arises from religious radical movements that call on people to return to pure religious teachings and fight against secular regimes that deviate from pure religious teachings (Abdullah, 2016). Therefore, preventative efforts, such as religious moderation initiatives, are needed to eliminate the concept of radicalism. However, there is community resistance to religious moderation in its implementation. This occurs, for example, in a campus where the concept of radicalism penetrates it, driven by an atmosphere of academic and social freedom on campus that is difficult to control (Lestari et al. 2021). Resistance to religious moderation on campus arises among lecturers who occupy strategic positions in enhancing national insight to avoid radicalism (Sadiah, 2018). Resistance manifests itself in talks and debates by lecturers who claim to support suicide bombings since they are parts of police and government manipulation. Furthermore, lecturers who have been exposed to radicalism tend to support or justify the understanding and practice of those who wish to establish an Islamic da'wah or caliphate while either directly or indirectly rejecting the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Huda & Haryanto, 2018).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The focus of this study departs from the case of a lecturer from the State Islamic University of Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau (UIN SUSKA Riau) who received a one-level demotion as a disciplinary sanction. Disciplinary sanction was imposed because he was indicated to involve in the radicalism movement by inviting a prominent Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*) as a speaker in campus. This case was chosen as the starting point for the research focus by looking for information through online news and social media. This case is relevant to the resistance of lecturers to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. The data employed in this study are primary data from interviews with 17 lecturers and 4 university leaders and also main document such as Semester Lesson Plan. As an addition to the primary data, this study also employed secondary data from books, journals, and online media documentation related to the involvement of lecturers and universities who are indicated to involve in the radicalism movement in Indonesia.

The sources of information in this study were lecturers and leaders of UIN SUSKA Riau, as well as online media texts. The lecturers chosen as the informants were those who are indicated opposing religious moderation policy. Meanwhile, the leaders of UIN SUSKA Riau chosen as the informants were those who are directly related with religious moderation policy (Rector, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Dean, and Head of Academic Department). Data collection was conducted by interviewing research informants and or tracking informants' statements on social media. The interviews were conducted directly (meeting) and indirectly (mobile connection) to obtain information regarding lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy. The data from the interviews are supported with informants' statements through online news excerpts, WhatsApp conversations, and YouTube programs containing lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. After the data were collected, the data were analyzed using the interpretation analysis method. This analysis began with "restatement" by quoting interview notes, followed by a "description" process to find the meanings provided in the data in each informant's statement.

RESULTS

Forms of resistance to religious moderation policy (open and closed resistance)

Religious moderation is defined as a choice in perspective, attitude, and behavior that falls somewhere in the middle of the left and right extremes (perspective, attitude, and behavior exceed the limits in religious understanding and practice). In its practice, religious moderation is a religious

attitude that balances one's own religious practice with respect for the religious practice of others who have different beliefs. This balance will prevent a person from being excessive and extreme. Religious moderation can also be defined as a moderating attitude capable of uniting two opposing parties in a balanced way without sacrificing the principle of truth. The religious moderation policy set by the government through The Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia inflicted resistance from some lecturers. Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy includes three things, namely perspective, attitude, and behavior of "giving in" to other beliefs, or in other words the majority must give in to the minority.

Open resistance

Open resistance is more focused on remarks and actions that are not moderate (intolerant), causing communal anxiety. Open resistance includes (1) making statements that tend to be contrary to religious moderation in the form of hate speech with a racist tone, such as demeaning a tribe. This act can be seen from the statement by a lecturer with an initial BM in a WhatsApp group "For Better UIN Suska" below:

"Your surrounding? Is it the UIN SUSKA Riau, sir? Since what year has Chinese been at the UIN SUSKA Riau? Don't defame it, sir. There are a lot of insolent Javanese. Those who undermine the UIN SUSKA Riau. It's the Javanese, not the Chinese." (May 11, 2021)

The statement was amplified with the interview findings with some lecturers who refused to be named, for example the following statement by a lecturer with an initial NS:

"Even though my wife comes from the ethnic group that dominates the position in the UIN SUSKA Riau, I still couldn't occupy the strategic leader position in the university (although I ran for election) because I'm not a part of their tribe." (Interview, October 11, 2021)

In accordance with that matter, AS also disclosed:

"Even though I'm close with the leaders of the UIN SUSKA Riau, I was not chosen as the leader at the faculty level (during the candidacy) because I don't belong in the same ethnic group as them." (Interview, October 12, 2021)

In addition, based on the observation findings related to the top leader positions of the UIN SUSKA Riau of 2021-2025, it can be seen that the dominance of one of the tribes in Riau is very apparent. This is evident from the formation of officials inaugurated by the Rector of the UIN SUSKA Riau on July 1, 2021, who were dominated by those of the same ethnic group as the Rector (UIN SUSKA RIAU, 2021).

(2) The movement that supports the caliphate in Indonesia. This can be seen in the case of the State Civil Apparatus lecturer at the UIN SUSKA Riau who had to receive a disciplinary punishment in the form of a demotion due to his position as an official at one of the faculties by knowing the invitation to the alumni seminar of the Faculty of Sharia and Law at the UIN SUSKA Riau, which invited the Grand Imam of Islamic Defenders Front, Muslim cleric Rizieq Shihab, that took the theme "Islamness, Indonesianness, and Diversity". It was held on Thursday, April 6, 2017, at the hall of the UIN SUSKA Riau. In the end, the event was canceled due to the request of the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia to the Rector to cancel it (Cakaplah, 2017). Although the event was canceled, the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia still imposed disciplinary sanction on the person responsible of this event in 2019 in the form of a one-level demotion and barred him from occupying positions at the UIN SUSKA Riau. This was confirmed by AM (the Rector at the time) who stated:

“That it is true that AK was sentenced to disciplinary sanction by the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia because he was indicated of having affiliation with the caliphate movement by inviting Islamic Defenders Front figure, Muslim cleric Rizieq Shihab, to the UIN SUSKA Riau in 2017. We, as the leaders who are also the extension of the Minister, are obliged to implement the decision.” (Interview, October 13, 2021)

Aside from this case, the movement to support the caliphate can be seen from the case of the raising of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia flag on the closing night of 14th National Wirakarya Camp in 2018 at the UIN SUSKA Riau campsite. The event was led by the Campus Da’wah Council Al-Karomah of the UIN SUSKA Riau, which was under the scrutiny of the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Republic of Indonesia. Their boldness in flying the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia flag cannot be separated from the role of former Campus Da’wah Council activists who are currently serving as lecturers at the UIN SUSKA Riau, who appear to be disregarding and discreetly supporting the movement. This is as expressed by the lecturer with an initial JP:

“There’s no need to exaggerate that issue (the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia flag). Think of it like a party or mass organization flag raised during an event. (Interview, October 15, 2021)

However, in the end, the leaders of the UIN SUSKA Riau took a firm stance against the existence of Campus Da’wah Council Al-Karomah of the UIN SUSKA Riau, notably the suspension of the Campus Da’wah Council by the Rector of the UIN SUSKA Riau on December 9, 2018. The Campus Da’wah Council was suspended on the basis that they were involved in campus provocation, as evidenced by the video clip circulating on social media.

(3) Not participating in socializing the religious moderation in lectures. This can be seen from the details of the lecture materials that does not include the values of religious moderation as follows:

Table 2: The documents of semester lesson plan of Tarbawi Interpretation Course, Islamic Education Study Program, The Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teacher Training, The UIN SUSKA Riau of Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, 2020.

No.	Lecture materials
1.	Verses interpretation about Allah as preceptor
2.	Verses interpretation about angels as preceptors
3.	Verses interpretation about prophet and apostle as the prototypes of preceptor
4.	Verses interpretation about human as abdun
5.	Verses interpretation about human as caliph
6.	Verses interpretation about the universe
7.	Verses interpretation about knowledge
8.	Verses interpretation about living environment
9.	Verses interpretation about society
10.	Verses interpretation about virtue and evil
11.	Verses interpretation about amenities and disaster
12.	Verses interpretation about death
13.	Verses interpretation about afterlife

The Semester Lesson Plan document does not contain the material of religious moderation. The data above shows that lecturers’ refusal to involve in the activity or campaign against moderation acts. The refusal presents itself not only in the form of remarks and a lack of participation in socializing, but also manifests in the form of actions that are not moderate (intolerant) in responding to the religious moderation policy.

Closed resistance

Closed resistance is primarily concerned with protesting the implementation of a policy that is contrary to its understanding and beliefs, causing anxiety in the society.

Symbolic closed resistance

The symbolic closed resistance includes (1) protests against the discourse of religious moderation on campus. This is evident from the response from the lecturers who tend to be cynical of the government's discourse on implementing the idea of religious moderation on campus, as expressed by one of the lecturers with an initial AW:

"Religious moderation is identical with Islam Nusantara, which tends to practice religion based on communal traditions that are full of superstition and heresy." (Interview, October 18, 2021)

In accordance with that statement, SF also expressed:

"Religious moderation is the mission of a group of mass organizations that currently dominate the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, hence there is a perception that the Ministry of Religious Affairs (including the State Islamic University) will become one color." (Interview, October 18, 2021)

The data above illustrates the form of closed resistance to the discourse of moderation implementation on campus. (2) The protest against the usage of religious moderation symbols such as Islam Nusantara. This can be seen in the systematic and massive movement in rejecting Islam Nusantara through a study conducted by the Campus Da'wah Council of the UIN SUSKA Riau on Friday, November 30, 2018 at 08:00 PM at Al-Jami'ah Mosque of the UIN SUSKA Riau with the theme "Islam Nusantara Destroys Islam". The sermon talks about Islam Nusantara, which is a part of religious moderation symbols that are seen to be harmful to Islamic teachings. Religious practices with communal traditions, such as musical accompaniment and certain prayers, are a kind of opposition to Islamic law. (3) The protest against the implementation of religious moderation lesson. This can be seen in the lecture material details which does not contain religious moderate values as follows:

Table 2: The Documents of Semester Lesson Plan of Tarbawi Hadith Course, Islamic Education Management, The Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teacher Training, The State Islamic University of Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, 2020.

No.	Lecture materials
1.	Hadith about Shame as a part of faith
2.	Hadith about the Realization of faith in respecting guests
3.	Hadith about the intention/motivation of alms
4.	Hadith about the Importance of honesty
5.	Hadith about Muslim work ethic
6.	Hadith about the Responsibility of a leader
7.	Hadith about the prohibition of corruption and collusion
8.	Hadith about the Prohibition of hoarding groceries
9.	Hadith about the Prohibition of prejudice
10.	Hadith about Muslim fraternity
11.	Hadith about the Social order of Muslim
12.	Hadith about Social concern
13.	Hadith about Environment concern

This Semester Lesson Plan document does not contain religious moderation material. The data above illustrate that there is a protest against the implementation of religious moderation lesson. The rejection presents itself not only in the form of statements and a refusal to socialize, but also in behaviors that are not moderate (intolerant) in responding to the religious moderation policy.

Ideologically closed resistance

Ideologically closed resistance consists of three components. First, the lecturer's stance on differences of opinion in *fiqh*, which tend to be treacherous to their teacher's teachings and differences in religion. This can be seen from the religious perspective that feels self-righteous, easily labels everything as heresy, consider other adherents of the same faith misguided and even disbelieves them. Furthermore, they see people of different religions as parties to be fought. This is as expressed by a lecturer with an initial DY:

"The Prophet of Allah (PBUH) has exemplified the virtues of worship to the companions, who were then followed by the Salaf generation. Therefore, every practice of worship that is not in accordance with what was done by The Prophet of Allah (PBUH) and the generation of the Salaf is deemed a misguided heresy and will lead to hell." (Interview, October 16, 2021)

In accordance with that statement, a lecturer an initial HI also expressed:

"Every muslim has the obligation to carry out the teachings of Islam as a whole (kaffah) as practiced by the Prophet of Allah (PBUH) and the Salaf generation. This is what distinguishes the ahlu sunnah and ahlu bid'ah." (Interview, October 16, 2021)

Second, the lecturer's attitude is not as a mediator who can unite two opposing groups together in a balanced way without abandoning the principle of truth. This can be seen from the lecturers' attitude on the controversial case of *Barisan Ansor Serbaguna* of *Nahdlatul Ulama* members who guarded the church during the Christmas celebration, which caused pros and cons in the society. When asked for an opinion from one of the lecturers with an initial SF, he stated:

"What they did was a form of excessive behavior and seemed to be a lack of work." (Interview, October 15, 2021)

In accordance with that statement, a lecturer with an initial AY also said:

"Christmas is the ritual of the Christians. So, participating in guarding the church is equal with following the ritual." (Interview, October 15, 2021)

Third, the religious behavior of lecturers is not balanced between practicing their own faith and respecting the religious rituals of those with different beliefs, such as refusing to say Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to the Christians. This is evident from the response of a lecturer at the UIN SUSKA Riau with the initial GA to Buya Hamka's video wishing his Christian neighbors a Merry Christmas (Youtube, 2020):

"Saying Merry Christmas is not in the teachings of Islam. While the Qur'an emphasizes that Muslims are not allowed to participate in the affairs of other religions, lakum diinukum waliya diin" (Interview, October 15, 2021)

In accordance with that statement, a lecturer with an initial ST further said:

"Saying merry Christmas is the same as celebrating Christmas, which is seen as being able to thin a person's religion and lack confidence in the teachings of his religion." (Interview, October 15, 2021)

The statement above shows that the lecturers' perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors toward religious moderation are seen as an exclusive attitude (self-righteousness) and an act of "giving in" to other religions. It even comes to an understanding that the majority must give in to the minority.

Factors that increase rejection (cultural and structural)

Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy, both openly and privately is influenced by cultural and structural factors. Cultural factors are values that grow and develop in the community. Meanwhile, structural factors are patterns of relation between individuals and groups that exist in the community.

Cultural factor

Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy is more influenced by spiritualism factors. This is as expressed by one of the lecturers with the initial AD who is also a Riau cultural expert:

"Riau is a Malay land that is identical with Islam. So, it is appropriate to us to commit to Islam teachings." (Interview, October 13, 2021)

In line with this, the lecturer with the initials SF also stated:

"Muslims must have faith in their own religion's teachings. Furthermore, because Islam is the majority religion, there is no need to give in to other minority religions." (Interview, October 13, 2021)

The data above illustrates that a person's religious spirit is strongly influenced by the local culture, hence tolerance towards people of other religions is seen as a form of loss of religious spirit and is even seen as succumbing to adherents of other religions.

Structural factor

Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy is more influenced by integration factors. This is as expressed by one of the lecturers with the initial AL:

"Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policies is more due to a partial understanding of Islam towards regulations on religious moderation issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, which appear suddenly and without first inviting academics to conduct extensive discussions and socialization." (Interview, October 18, 2021)

In line with that statement, ZK which is one of the officials of UIN SUSKA Riau also said:

"The Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia's policy on religious moderation should be widely disseminated and discussed among academics who are identical with their critical attitude" (Interview, October 18, 2021)

Based on the interview presented above, it can be understood that cultural factors in the form of government regulations that are widely socialized greatly affect a person's perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors in being religious.

Implications or impacts of rejection to efforts to develop an atmosphere of moderate university

Lecturers' rejection of the religious moderation policy has implications for efforts to create a moderate campus, including:

Make the campus becomes more exclusive

Campus exclusivity is marked by the religious attitude of the academic community which is intolerant. This can be seen from the perspectives of the lecturers related to the video of K.H. Ma'ruf Amin wishing Merry Christmas. This is as stated by one of the lecturers with the initial AR:

"Wishing everyone a Merry Christmas is a sort of buying and selling religion. Sir, what will happen to this country.... Astaghfirullah." (Interview, October 14, 2021).

In accordance with this, a lecturer with the initial ST stated:

"That's the power of position, he broke the fatwa himself for the sake of a piece of bone" (Interview, October 14, 2021).

The data above indicates the attitude of lecturers who are intolerant towards adherents of other religions have implications for efforts to develop a moderate university atmosphere.

Difficult to accept differences in religious understanding

There are tendencies of the academic community to have difficulties in accepting differences in religious understanding which includes *khilafiyah* issues, such as reading Qunut during the dawn prayer, chanting prayers, using a drum, and so on. This can be seen from the rejection of the UIN SUSKA Riau's Rector policy to chant prayers during official activities, including flag ceremonies, graduations, and other activities (Youtube, 2019). The rejection is carried out in a closed manner in the form of not participating in chanting and grumbling when the *shalawat* is recited. It is as stated by one of the university leaders with the initial SJ during the 2019 undergraduate graduation ceremony. When confirmed, he stated:

"What's the urgency of shalawat recital at the official graduation ceremony... making it looks like a communal Qur'an recitation." (Interview, October 18, 2021)

In line with this, a member of the university senate with the initial DD also stated:

"Chanting shalawat at the undergraduate graduation ceremony is the Rector's wish, who is also a mass organization activist who likes prayer and yet it makes the ceremony looks like a long-winded event." (Interview, October 18, 2021)

Something that was more frontal happened during the change of the Rector. The *shalawat* chant no longer be heard during the undergraduate graduation ceremony in 2021. One of the graduation committee members, RY, stated:

"It is up to the Rector whether or not shalawat appropriate to be included in a graduation ceremony." (Interview, October 18, 2021).

The rejection is based on the difficulty of accepting the differences in religious understanding. They claim that *shalawatan* recital is a tradition of certain mass organizations and should not be applied on campuses that have a pluralistic religious understanding of the academic community.

The emergence of intolerant groups in universities

Organizationally, intolerant groups are not visible at the UIN SUSKA Riau. However, individually, groups of students who are affiliated to certain organizations are indicated to have a tendency to be intolerant, such as forcing their will on other groups. This can be seen from the event of raising the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia flag by a group of students at the closing ceremony of the 14th Religious University Wirakarya Camp on May 18, 2018, at the UIN SUSKA Riau campsite. This case received serious attention from the Minister of Religious Affairs and all his staff. Furthermore, based on the findings of the Research and Development Center of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in 2018, the UIN SUSKA Riau was put in the Red Zone (Beware) of radicalism. This demonstrates the emergence of previously non-existent intolerant groups at the UIN SUSKA Riau. This was conveyed by a lecturer who with the initial RH:

"The emergence of intolerant groups at UIN Suska occurred after the reforms, which were marked by freedom of expression among students, causing various organizations affiliated with extreme ideologies such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Islamic Defenders Front infiltrated internal campus organizations through spiritual activities in campus mosques." (Interview, October 20, 2021)

In line with this, a lecturer with the initial AR also stated that:

"Besides the mosque that has become a center of movement, the activists make Ma'had Al-Jami'ah (Student Dormitory) and the Campus Da'wah Council as centers of cadre activities." (Interview, October 20, 2021).

Based on the data above, it can be perceived that the intolerance that occurs is more about the militancy attitude of student groups in carrying out the vision and mission of the organizations they follow.

DISCUSSION

The results of the study indicate that: 1) The forms of resistance of lecturers to religious moderation policy are open resistance in the form of statements and actions that are not moderate (intolerant), and closed resistance in the form of protests over the implementation of a policy that is not in accordance with their understanding and beliefs. 2) Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy is influenced by cultural factors such as high spiritualism (spirit) in religion, which leads them to believe that tolerant attitudes toward adherents of other religions are a form of surrender to them, as well as structural factors in the form of integration, which leads to *mu'amalah*, strongly influencing a person's religious perspective, attitude, and intolerant behavior. 3) Lecturers' resistance has an impact on efforts to develop moderate universities, namely the religious attitude of the tolerant academic community, the academic community's willingness to accept differences in religious understanding, and the emergence of tolerant groups in higher education.

Lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia indicates a less comprehensive understanding of the religious moderation concept, which emphasizes the balance of understanding of differences. The fact that Indonesia has many differences, particularly in religious affairs, provides an opportunity for the development of an understanding that is open to accepting other "truths". The religious moderation discourse arises as a response to numerous intolerance and radicalism groups that emerge in the name of religion (Zafi, 2020). This is consistent with the opinion from Hidayat et al. (2020), who state that, at the policy level, moderation has become a strategic effort to prevent radicalism. Religious moderation can be developed by interacting across religions and sects within the internal religious community as much as possible (Sutrisno, 2019). Meanwhile, religious moderation includes recognizing the presence of other parties, having a tolerant attitude, respecting differences of opinion, and refraining from forcing their will by violence (Akhmadi, 2019). Thus, moderation fosters an attitude of not constraining oneself, of not being exclusive or closed, but of being open and willing to adapt (Irawan, 2020). Religious moderation is defined as a choice in perspective, attitude, and behavior that falls somewhere in the middle of the left and right extremes options. In practice, religious moderation is a religious attitude that balances one's own religious and respect for the religious practices of others with different beliefs.

Lecturers' resistance to the religious moderation policy shows a form of rejection of government policies in maintaining state stability in the frame of diversity. In the context of radicalism movement, which is often considered as instruments of counter-hegemonic movements, radicalism arises from religious radical movements that call on people to return to pure religious teachings and fight against secular regimes that deviate from pure religious teachings (Abdullah, 2016). Therefore, preventative attempts, such as religious moderation initiatives, are required to eliminate radicalism concept. However, there is community resistance to religious moderation in its implementation. This, for example, occurs in a campus where the radicalism concept penetrates the campus driven by an atmosphere of academic and social freedom which is difficult to control (Lestari et al. 2021). The resistance to religious moderation on campus tend to occur among lecturers who have strategic position in enhancing national insight to avoid radicalism (Sadiyah, 2018). Resistance manifests itself in talks and debates by lecturers who claim to support suicide bombings since they are parts of police and government manipulation. Furthermore, lecturers who have been exposed to radicalism tend to support or justify the understanding and practice of those who want to establish an Islamic da'wah

or caliphate while either directly or indirectly rejecting the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila (Huda & Haryanto, 2018).

The result of this study is the negative responses of the lecturers toward religious moderation policy in handling radicalism in Indonesia. The results of this study have practical and policy implications. The practical implication of this study's results is that it becomes an obstacle for the government in handling radicalism to maintain state stability within the framework of diversity. The policy implication of the results of this study is the need to issue government regulations related to the implementation of religious moderation in handling radicalism in Indonesia. Thus, to overcome these obstacles, it is necessary to issue a government rule that regulates the implementation of religious moderation in a comprehensive manner that is able in accommodating the interests of various parties or groups.

CONCLUSION

This research focused on the resistance of lecturers at the State Islamic University of Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau to the religious moderation policy intended to handle radicalism. This research concludes that the resistance among lecturers manifested in two primary forms which are open resistance and closed resistance. Open resistance involves overt actions and statements against religious moderation, including hate speech and support for movements like the caliphate. Meanwhile the closed resistance involves less visible forms of dissent, such as passive protests or non-compliance with the policy. These resistances were influenced by cultural factors, including high levels of spiritualism, and structural factors, such as the integration of government regulations that were perceived as inconsistent with the lecturers' beliefs.

This research adds a new perspective to the symptoms of lecturers' resistance to religious moderation policies in handling radicalism in Indonesia, raising new questions about the government's efforts to provide guidance to lecturers on the issue of religious moderation in handling radicalism in Indonesia. The guidance for the lecturers includes the perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors in moderate religious. These perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors will assist the government in handling radicalism in Indonesia.

The findings suggest that resistance to religious moderation policy is deeply rooted in cultural and structural factors within the university. This resistance could hinder the government's efforts to curb radicalism in educational institutions and promote a tolerant academic environment. This research highlights the complexity of implementing top-down policies in environments where underlying beliefs and structures do not align with the policy's goals.

This research has limitations in terms of cases, methods, and groups of lecturers. Thus, it should be complemented by other methods that may be carried out by future researchers. This study highlights a case that occurred to a lecturer only at the UIN SUSKA Riau. So, the findings may not be generalizable to other institutions in Indonesia or beyond. However, it is possible for the same cases happened in other universities in Indonesia.

Future studies should explore similar resistance in other universities across Indonesia to determine whether the findings are consistent nationwide. By conducting long-term studies could help other researchers in understanding how resistance to religious moderation policies evolves over time. This research also suggests other researchers to do comparative studies. By comparing resistance to religious moderation policies in Indonesia with similar contexts in other countries could provide insights into how different cultural and structural factors influence the success or failure of such policies.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS:

“Conceptualization, MM and M; methodology, MFZH and RR; formal analysis, MM and M; resources, MM, MFZH and RR; data curation, MM; writing original draft preparation, MM, M and MFZH; writing, review and editing, RR; supervision, MM.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

The authors would like to thank all contributors and informants in the interview session.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, A. (2016). Gerakan Radikalisme dalam Islam: Perspektif historis. *Addin*, 10(1), 1-28.
- Afwadzi, B., Sumbulah, U., Ali, N., & Qudsy, S.Z. (2024). Religious moderation of Islamic university students in Indonesia: Reception of religious texts. *HTS Teologiese Studies*, 80(1), 1-9.
- Akhmadi, A. (2019). Moderasi beragama dalam keragaman Indonesia. *Jurnal Diklat Keagamaan*, 13(2), 45-55.
- Aly, A. (2013). The policy response to home-grown terrorism: Reconceptualising prevent and resilience as collective resistance. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 8(1), 2-18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789594>
- Al-Rawi, A. (2016). Anti-ISIS humor: Cultural resistance of radical ideology. *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 17, 52-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2016.1157076>
- Arif, S. (2020). Moderasi beragama dalam diskursus negara Islam: Pemikiran KH Abdurrahman Wahid. *Jurnal Bimas Islam*, 13(1), 73-104. <https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v13i1.189>
- Basri, B., & Dwiningrum, N. R. (2019). Potensi radikalisme di perguruan tinggi: Studi kasus di Politeknik Negeri Balikpapan. *JSHP: Jurnal Sosial Humaniora dan Pendidikan*, 3(1), 84-91. <https://doi.org/10.32487/jshp.v3i1.546>
- Brocker, M., & Künkler, M. (2013). Religious parties: Revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis: Introduction. *Party Politics*, 19(2), 171-186. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812473673>
- Cakaplah. (2017). *Rektor UIN ditelepon Menteri, seminar menghadirkan Habib Rizieq pindah lokasi*. <https://www.cakaplah.com/berita/baca/3289/2017/04/04/rektor-uin-ditelpon-menteri-seminar-menghadirkan-habib-rizieq-pindah-lokasi#sthash.U5vRyA39.dpbs>
- Cao, Q. (2017). Rupture in modernity: A case study of radicalism in the late Qing Chinese press debate. *Critical Arts*, 13(6), 9-28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2017.1407809>
- Cross, R., & Snow, D. A. (2011). Radicalism within the context of social movements: Processes and types. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 115-130. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.5>
- Currás, B. X., & Sastre, I. (2020). Egalitarianism and resistance: A theoretical proposal for iron age Northwestern Iberian archaeology. *Anthropological Theory*, 20(3), 300-329. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499618814685>
- Damanik, E. L., & Ndonga, Y. (2020). Revelation is a symbol: Anti-radicalism of pluri-religious communities according to Jaspers in the context of Indonesia. *International Journal of Criminology and Sociology*, 9, 587-603. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2020.09.57>
- Detik News. (2023, 31 January). *Setara: Pelanggaran kebebasan beragama 2022 meningkat dibanding tahun lalu*. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6544319/setara-pelanggaran-kebebasan-beragama-2022-meningkat-dibanding-tahun-lalu>
- Factor, R., Kawachi, I., & Williams, D. R. (2011). Understanding high-risk behavior among non-dominant minorities: A social resistance framework. *Social Science and Medicine*, 73(9), 1292-1301. DOI: [10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.07.027](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.07.027)
- Fodeman, A. D., Snook, D. W., & Horgan, J. G. (2020). Picking up and defending the faith: Activism and radicalism among Muslim converts in the United States. *Political Psychology*, 41(4), 679-698. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12645>

- Hafid, W. (2020). Geneologi radikalisme di Indonesia: Melacak akar sejarah gerakan radikal. *Al-Tafaqquh: Journal of Islamic Law*, 1(1), 31-46. <http://dx.doi.org/10.33096/altafaqquh.v1i1.37>
- Hidayat, A. S., Hadi, S., & Subejo, S. (2020). Kontra radikalisasi dalam penyuluhan Agama Islam di Kabupaten Sukoharjo. *Komunika: Jurnal Dakwah dan Komunikasi*, 4(1), 77-93. <https://doi.org/10.24090/komunika.v14i1.2954>
- Huda, U., & Haryanto, T. (2018). Strategi penanggulangan radikalisme di perguruan tinggi Kabupaten Banyumas. *An-Nidzam: Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan dan Studi Islam*, 5(1), 39-61. <https://doi.org/10.33507/an-nidzam.v5i1.163>
- Iffan, A., Nur, M. R., & Saiin, A. (2020). Konseptualisasi moderasi beragama sebagai langkah preventif terhadap penanganan radikalisme di Indonesia. *Perada*, 3(2), 87-199. <https://doi.org/10.35961/perada.v3i2.220>
- Irawan, I. K. A. (2020). Merajut nilai-nilai kemanusiaan melalui moderasi beragama. *Proceeding STHD Klaten Jawa Tengah*, 1 (1), 82-89.
- Kemenag. (2021, May 1). *Ini langkah-langkah Kemenag dalam penguatan moderasi beragama*. <https://kemenag.go.id/moderasi-beragama/ini-langkah-langkah-kemenag-dalam-penguatan-moderasi-beragama-tb2dsa>
- Kompas. (2018, November 20). *BIN: 7 perguruan tinggi negeri terpapar paham radikal*. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/11/20/23070271/bin-7-perguruan-tinggi-negeri-terpapar-paham-radikal>
- Kurniawan, I. (2020). Memaknai radikalisme di Indonesia. *Taklim: Jurnal Studi Pendidikan Islam*, 3(1), 70-82. <https://doi.org/10.52166/talim.v3i1.1848>
- Lestari, D., Sutono, A., & Sudrajat, R. (2021). Upaya dosen mata kuliah umum Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan dalam mencegah paham radikalisme di perguruan tinggi. *Majalah Lontar*, 33(1), 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.26877/ltr.v33i1.8045>
- Mata Dunia Joss. (2020). *Mengejutkan! Buya Hamka ternyata mengucapkan selamat natal pada tetangganya yang Nasrani*. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p_yNAj_Hj7c
- Ma'arif, B.S., Rahmat, M., Yahya, M.W.H.M., & Syafei, M. (2024). Educational communication based on Quranic religious pluralism in increasing religious moderation of Muslim's student in Indonesia. *International Journal of Religion*, 5(8), 557-569.
- Murtadlo, M. (2020). *Menakar moderasi beragama di perguruan tinggi*. Puslitbang Kemenag Republik Indonesia.
- Muthohirin, N. (2015). Radikalisme Islam dan pergerakannya di media sosial. *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies*, 11(2), 240-259. <https://doi.org/10.18196/aiijis.2015.0050.240-259>
- Noviani, D., Hilmin, Adil, M., & Mustafiyanti. (2024). Religious moderation realizes harmonization of the Malay Islamic community in South Sumatera. *International Journal of Religion*, 5(6), 1146-1155.
- Nurrohim, A., Setiawan, A.H., Sweta, A.A., & Muthoifn. (2024). The concept of Islamic moderation in Indonesia: A comparative study in Tafsir An-Nur and Tafsir of Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). *International Journal of Religion*, 5(10), 2110-2125.
- Sadiyah, D. (2018). Strategi dakwah penanaman nilai-nilai Islam dalam menangkal paham radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa. *Anida: Aktualisasi Nuansa Ilmu Dakwah*, 18(2), 219-238. <https://doi.org/10.15575/anida.v18i2.5064>
- Saputra, R. E. (2018). Sikap dan perilaku keberagamaan guru dan dosen pendidikan Agama Islam. *Convey Report*, 1(8).
- Silver, D. (2018). Everyday radicalism and the democratic imagination: Dissensus, rebellion and utopia. *Politics and Governance*, 6(1), 161-168. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i1.1213>
- Suska TV Official. (2019). *LIVE SUSKA TV (Prosesi wisuda UIN Suska Riau periode Juli 2019)*. Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaUObSNN-8A>

- Sutrisno, E. (2019). Aktualisasi moderasi beragama di lembaga pendidikan. *Jurnal Bimas Islam*, 12(2), 324-348. <https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v12i2.113>
- Syatar, A., Abubakar, A., Kurniati, Mundzir, C., Pallawagau, B., & Syarif, M.R. (2024). A model of strengthening religious moderation in countering radical and intolerant understanding of students at Islamic university. *International Journal of Religion*, 5(10), 2633- 3538.
- Tamtanus, A. S. (2018). Pemikiran: Menetralisir radikalisme di perguruan tinggi melalui para dosen. *Untirta Civic Education Journal*, 3(2), 206-223. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30870/ucej.v3i2.4536>
- Trehearne, B. (2018). Canadian modernism at the present time. *Modernist Cultures*, 13(4), 465-495.
- UIN SUSKA RIAU. (2021, July 1). *Rektor resmi lantik 14 orang cabinet baru UIN Suska Riau*. <https://uin-suska.ac.id/2021/07/01/rektor-resmi-lantik-14-orang-kabinet-baru-uin-suska-riau/>
- Ushama, T. (2014). The phenomenon of extremism in religion in Muslim life: An analysis of its roots, causes and nature. *Asian Social Science*, 10(14), 239-253. DOI:10.5539/ass.v10n14p239
- Vinthagen, S., & Johansson, A. (2013). Everyday resistance: Exploration of a concept and its theories. *Resistance Studies Magazine*, 1(1), 1-46.
- Wahid, A. (2018). Fundamentalisme dan radikalisme Islam: Telaah kritis tentang eksistensinya masa kini. *Sulesana: Jurnal Wawasan Keislaman*, 12(1), 61-75. <https://doi.org/10.24252/sulesana.v12i1.5669>
- Zafi, A. A. (2020). Penerapan nilai-nilai moderasi Al-Qur'an dalam pendidikan Islam. *Jurnal Studi Ilmu-ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Hadis*, 21(1), 23-46. <https://doi.org/10.14421/qh.2020.2101-02>
- Zheng, S. (2015). A superior way for the transforming China: The ultimate ideal or a feasible solution. *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 8, 313-318. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-015-0078-7>