



RESEARCH ARTICLE

Model of Power Relations for District and Village Partnerships to Improve Government Performance in East Lombok, Indonesia

Muhammad Saleh^{1*}, Kushandajani, Teguh Yuwono², Nunik Retno Herawati³

¹Gunung Rinjani University, Selong Indonesia

^{2,3,4} Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: Nov 24, 2024	<p>This study aims to describe the dynamics of village and supra-village power relations in East Lombok Regency, NTB. In addition to explaining, it also offers a new model of village and district power relations to improve the performance of the two governments. So far, the power relations between villages and districts have been more dominant. This condition impacts the village's dependence on the district/supra village, which is very high. The dynamics of power relations result from opening the democratic faucet at all levels, both central and village. Villages as part of local government entities have also undergone significant changes. This can be seen from the position of the village getting more assertive with the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages and the latest amendment to Law Number 3 of 2024. With this law, villages have a high level of confidence for several reasons, including the identity of the village and the village has been clarified; the state recognizes authority based on the right of village origin and local-scale authority (subordination); villages are budgeted through the State Budget in the form of Village Funds (DD); The opening of opportunities for new elites to emerge in the village as a result of political liberalization. To explain this phenomenon of power relations, a qualitative method is used with a case approach. Data collection techniques through interviews, observations, FGDs, and document data analysis are analyzed using the Miles and Huberman model. The study results show dynamic village power relations and supra-villages in East Lombok Regency. The partnership power relationship model between villages and districts/supra villages is a rational choice to build a mutually reinforcing power relationship. Partnership power relations put villages and districts in the same position because they have the same strength, resources, and passion for the welfare of the people. In the context of coaching and supervision, the district's authority is more about efforts to synchronize or harmonize the same development vision between villages and districts, not to kill village creativity.</p>
Accepted: Jan 7, 2025	
Keywords	
Partnership	
Regency	
United States	
Village	
Government	
*Corresponding Author:	
smuh4385@gmail.com	

INTRODUCTION

The government, as a policymaker, must consistently carry out policies and have a firm position also in cracking down on all forms of violations that occur and avoid the habit of blaming the culture of the local community (Wang 2021). The role of central government regulators in regions and villages often has a negative impact when faced with local-scale authority. This condition usually forces areas and towns to adapt even if it is forced to do so for harmonization (Wu *et al.*, 2020)

Local/district governments play an essential role in facilitating collaboration among all regional stakeholders to increase the involvement of public, private, and village governments (Fatmawati *et al.*, 2022)). Fatmawati explained that the district government's innovation in managing specific fields as needed is a strategy to improve community welfare. This is done by reducing poverty and creating jobs through policymaking to develop main, superior, and innovative products. This approach aims to increase regional productivity and improve the welfare of the people in the area. (Sutikno *et al.*, 2024) Building power relations between the district and village governments must collaborate. With this partnership, the district and village programs synergize to serve the community's needs (Yusri, Handoko and Tinov, 2022) In addition, to foster positive relations, the two regions adopted an integrated cross-sectoral approach that requires transparent dialogue among stakeholders for economic, social, environmental, and other development. Furthermore, qualified and trustworthy human resources are needed to improve the quality of district and village relations (Sahrina *et al.*, 2022). The previous opinion was also strengthened by (Yasinta and Hidayah 2024) that the quality of human resources, regional competitiveness, and clean and accountable governance are urgent needs to improve the quality of relations between districts and villages. To strengthen the relationship between district and village governments, it is essential to govern according to the unique characteristics of the autonomy of each region (Akadun 2024). Local governments continue to play a role as stakeholders, community groups, and community leaders in finding joint solutions to development problems (Listiana and Ariyanto, 2024). Districts can act as a media for law enforcement through legal instruments as a means of political power by reviving legal institutions, values, and legislative procedures as a condition for the development process and supported by strong political, economic, and social structures (Kamuli, Anshari, and Istislam 2021). One of the strategies to increase community participation in development is to maintain the uniqueness of the district government in the community because it will produce various types of involvement (Maisyaroh et al. 2021). In carrying out constructive government functions, the district government requires an entrepreneurial leadership style and innovative work behaviour (Srimulyani and Hermanto, 2022). The success of district government programs simultaneously has a positive effect on the success of development both at the provincial and national scales and even at the village level (Tobing et al. 2024).

The success of district government programs simultaneously has a positive effect on the success of development both at the provincial and national scales and even at the village level (Hall et al. 2024). Another challenge is that health services in villages have begun to be entered by the industrialization of health, which impacts the increasingly expensive cost of quality health care in villages (Das et al. 2022). Another interesting phenomenon in South Korea is the tendency of high mortality rates in villages due to loneliness and social detachment as a result of the tradition of throwing away parents (Youn, Baldina, and Baek 2021). The granting of accurate and responsible authority to villages reflects the democratization process in implementing village autonomy to help the central government (Ash-Shidiqqi and Wibisono, 2018). In the context of government politics, there is a village assembly like the media to participate and articulate interests through deliberation. The large number of communities in the village provides an argument that village democracy is diverse and complements each other continuously. Hence, this condition strengthens the function of formal political institutions (Kulkarni 2012). The good news is that the stronger the relationship between the village elite and the supra village, the more the village head/village elite is strengthened as an intermediary between the people and the supra village. This certainly positively impacts the village because it gets more attention from the supra village (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). As part of the work of democracy in the village, the context of village authority consists of authority in the field of village governance, implementation of village development, development of village communities, and empowerment of village communities based on community initiatives, rights of origin and village customs (Rodiyah 2018). Another evidence of this in the village can be seen from the active role of women's groups in deliberations. This condition is also supported by strengthening women's awareness in villages to take part in deciding policies that are not gender-biased (Kushandajani and Alfirdaus 2019). Getting political legitimacy from the people in the village is a manifestation of the

active awareness of the people to maintain leadership based on the active participation of the people (Wong, Tang, and Liu 2020). One thing that cannot be denied is that supra-village flows towards the village cannot be avoided and that supra-village policies in national political management significantly influence social, political and economic life at the village level (Shams 2018).

Effective partnerships are characterized by trust, respect, intense communication, vision and togetherness, and cultural sensitivity so that they can make mutually beneficial decisions together (Blue-Banning et al. 2004). Partnerships with profit-oriented collaborators are based on accepting shared responsibility, recognizing the importance of community, and developing a sense of community (Horn and Kerasidou 2020). To create effective leadership relationships, the partnership process of dialogue, listening, and fostering trust is necessary to achieve common goals (Boursaw et al. 2021). Furthermore (Boursaw et al. 2021), the benefit of applying the concept of partnership is to strengthen the belief in the importance of power sharing and collective empowerment. Another advantage of partnerships is the transfer of knowledge and skills that leads to increased efficiency (Diehlmann et al. 2021). Partnerships and collaboration between sectors can accelerate the completion of work (Sørensen et al. 2021). Partnerships can also facilitate self-determination and be realized through effective communication (Skarsaune, Hanisch and Gjermestad, 2021). The same opinion is also expressed by (Murdoch, 2021). In the context of partnerships, the privacy and agency of partners must be protected. Partnership approaches can increase the value of tolerance by using language equivalent to other potential partners (Brinkerhoff, 2002). In many cases, partnership patterns also significantly provide public services between local and village governments and between government and private (Ahmed et al. 2020). Partnerships between stakeholders and institutional support can result in favourable policies for local and village governments (Guest, Knox, and Warhurst 2022).

The power relationship that is still ongoing today in several districts is a power relationship that is dependent from the village to the district is still occurring. For example, economic dependence, many villages depend on the allocation of village funds from the government and assistance from district and provincial governments for development and infrastructure projects. This creates a relationship of dependency that can influence decisions and policies at the village level. *Second*, the influence of guidelines and policies taken by the district government can directly impact the village regarding economic, social, and cultural development. For example, development programs launched by the government and district and provincial governments often must be implemented at the village level. This condition is undoubtedly a problem for the village because it is not uncommon to see village programs that have been decided through musrenbandesa that impact changes in the APBDes. (Rondinelli, D. A., & Nellis 2006); (Fitriani, E., Hofman, B., & Kaiser 2005).

It is essential to conduct this research to see and explore how the power relations will be built by villages and districts. Resources in the town, from human resources, budget resources, and political education, are more massive. This impacts the level of village confidence, which is getting higher. On the one hand, the district, which has been positioning itself as a structure above the village, thinks that the town is in the lower structure and must be subject to the district as a state representation. To explain the above political phenomenon, analysing how changing the relationship occurs and how the power relationship should be built between villages and districts to produce a constructive relationship for towns and districts to improve government performance is necessary.

METHODOLOGY

In writing this article, the author uses a qualitative method. Implementively, the research process in this article uses a case study, illustration, and descriptive approach. The case study details the pattern of political relations practised by the district elite and village elite in East Lombok Regency with the enactment of the Village Law. Qualitative methods that produce descriptive data are in the form of the author or oral words of people and observable behaviours (Lexy J. Moleong, 1990. Thing. 3). This method seeks to explain the problem being studied in depth. In qualitative research, the term triangulation is known, based on descriptive data, which is then interpreted by data to provide a conclusion that is reconfirmed to the informant through the FGD method or directly to the informant.

The phenomenological approach is more sensitive to descriptive information and maintains the integrity of the studied object (Strauss and Corbin, 2009). Lofland and Lofland (Moleong, 1990) suggest that the primary data sources in qualitative research are words, actions, and additional data such as documentation and others. In addition, the data sources are informants, observable activities and documents. According to the informant, it can be distinguished as the main perpetrator and not the main perpetrator. The source of data was obtained from the main actors, namely the Regent, regional appointees and village governments. (Matthew B. Miles; A. Michael Huberman 1994).

Data analysis was carried out based on qualitative data in the form of interviews, observations, and documents collected. Quantitative data obtained from official institutions, such as the General Election Commission, Regional Government, and Village Government, support explaining the pattern of political relations from 2008 to 2018. Qualitative analysis is a collaborative analysis between quantitative data and the results of interviews, observations, and documents to produce conclusions—composition and Process of Source Analysis (Matthew B. Miles; A. Michael Huberman, 1994). Starting from collecting/collecting data, then the data classified/grouped, then reducing the data and finally inferring.

RESULTS

Findings

Table 1. Table of Development of the Number of Villages in West Nusa Tenggara

JUMLAH DESA DI PROPINSI NUSA TENGGARA BARAT DARI TAHUN 2009 S.D 2019												Tambahan
	Desa											
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
Kabupaten Lombok Barat	88	88	123	124	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	34
Kabupaten Lombok Tengah	124	124	139	139	139	139	139	139	139	139	139	15
Kabupaten Lombok Timur	119	150	215	246	254	254	254	254	254	254	254	135
Kabupaten Sumbawa	165	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	1
Kabupaten Dompu	70	76	79	79	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	11
Kabupaten Bima	177	178	178	177	198	198	193	193	193	192	192	15
Kabupaten Sumbawa Barat	49	63	64	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	16
Kabupaten Lombok Utara	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	0
Kota Mataram	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Kota Bima	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	0
JUMLAH DESA	913	966	1085	1117	1146	1146	1141	1141	1141	1140	1140	227

The table above illustrates the changes in the number of villages and sub-districts in West Nusa Tenggara, especially in the East Lombok district. Based on data, 119 consists of 106 towns and 13 sub-districts; within four years, it will be 254 composed of 239 villages and 15 sub-districts. Rapid development has become a rare phenomenon compared to other districts in West Nusa Tenggara because expansion is often considered a conflict in the village. Every time, a new power arena, including the town, becomes a magnet for power struggles. The expansion of villages in East Lombok Regency is not without resistance from figures as stated by the Regent for the 2008-2013 and 2018-2023 periods for various reasons, such as having an impact on the breakup of village pectus, religious

facilities in the form of mosques will be broken, because according to community and religious leaders that mosques are a symbol of unity in the village and others.




Figure 1. Overview of Village and Regency Power Relations in Politics

The figure above shows the power relationship between the village and the district/supradesa. In the case found in East Lombok Regency, Indonesia, the dominance of supradesa/district power over the town is very clear and felt by the village. These forms of dominance are related to village expansion initiatives targeted by the district from 106 to 300 villages after the expansion of supradesa/regency seems to dictate the village in several ways; for example, supradesa instructs the use of village pecatu land for fields and others.

Table 2. List of Permendagri for Village Governments

It	Permendagri
1	Permendagri RI Number 20 of 2018 concerning Village Fund Management
2	Permendagri RI Number 1 of 2017 concerning Village Planning
3	Permendagri RI Number 2 of 2017 concerning Minimum Village Service Standards
4	Permendagri RI Number 1 of 2016 concerning Village Asset Management
5	Permendagri RI Number 45 of 2016 concerning Guidelines for Determining and Affirming Village Boundaries
6	Permendagri RI Number 44 of 2016 concerning Village Authority
7	Permendagri RI Number 110 of 2016 concerning Village Consultative Bodies
8	Permendagri RI Number 46 of 2016 concerning Village Head Reports
9	Permendagri RI Number 47 of 2016 concerning Village Government Administration
10	Permendagri RI Number 81 of 2015 concerning the Evaluation of Village and Village Development
11	Permendagri RI Number 82 of 2015 concerning the Appointment and Dismissal of Village Heads
12	Permendagri RI Number 83 of 2015 concerning the Appointment and Dismissal of Village Apparatus
13	Permendagri RI Number 84 of 2015 concerning the Organizational Structure and Work Procedures of Village Governments
14	Permendagri RI Number 111 of 2014 concerning Procedures for the Preparation of Village Regulations
15	Permendagri RI Number 112 of 2014 concerning the Election of Village Heads.

16	Permendagri RI Number 113 of 2014 concerning Village Financial Management
17	Permendagri RI Number 112 of 2014 concerning Village Development Guidelines

Table 3.3. List of PDTT Regulations for Village Governments

It	Permendes PDTT
1	Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration Number 6 of 2023 concerning Amendments to the Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration Number 21 of 2020 concerning General Guidelines for Village Development and Village Community Empowerment
2	Village Regulation of PDTT Number 7 of 2023 concerning Details of Village Fund Priorities in 2024
3	Permendes PDTT Number 13 of 2023 concerning Operational Guidelines for the Use of Village Funds in 2024
4	Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration Number 5 of 2022 concerning Amendments to the Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration Number 15 of 2020 concerning Organization and Work Procedures of the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration

In the second and third periods, Law Number 32 of 2004 is no longer valid and replaced by Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages. In Law 32 of 2004, which was lowered to Government Regulation Number 72 of 2005 concerning Villages, Village Fund Allocation (ADD) is given, based on Law Number 6 of 2014; in addition, ADD is also given Village Funds (DD), which are budgeted through the State Budget. The budget certainly increases because the source increases, but because it is not given in the form of grants, its use is also regulated in such a way by the district. This condition adds to the strength of the district in controlling the village in the implementation of the government. Based on the results of interviews with village heads during the FGD, almost all of them stated that they were "dizzy with stringent and rigid rules from the district", plus the regulations did not come out of one ministry but from three ministries, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of PDT and Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Home Affairs, from 2014 to 2018, has issued as many as 17 Permendagri on village regulation. In addition to the Minister of Home Affairs, it is added from the Ministry of PDT with the PDTT Regulation, as explained in Table 3.3. above.

Apart from the two ministries, the Ministry of Finance also made a Regulation of the Minister of Finance: PMK 145 of 2023 concerning the Management of Village Funds and PMK 146 of 2023 concerning the Determination of Village Fund Details for each Village for FY 2024. The data above shows that the rules arising from the village budgeting in the State Budget are quite a lot and even overlap between the three ministries because they both regulate how village funds are used. This is one of the reasons the village feels very complicated regarding arrangements related to village funds. Furthermore, according to them, the impact of this DD is that the district often entrusts programs that are not the authority of the village, such as the Stunting program, Direct Cash Assistance, livestock disease cases, and others. There is a perception built by the district that the village currently has a lot of budget, so all things related to government programs are directed to the village.

The phenomenon of power relations as very dominant impacts the implementation of village authority based on origin and a local scale imbued with the original autonomy of the village. The clash of regional autonomy as an implementation of decentralization and native village autonomy with authority based on origin is inevitable. One example of the one village, one field program is the termination of village apparatus position allowances, stunting programs, and others, which seriously disrupt the financial performance of villages. These are discussed together through the musrenbangdus and murenbangdes mechanisms.

The dominant power relationship practised by the district received a negative response from the village. This can be exemplified by the One Village, One Field program experiencing quite difficult

obstacles because the policy is contrary to the law. The land that will be used as a field is the land of the village treasury, which is the village treasury land intended to meet the needs of the village. The village heads who oppose argue that if it is a campaign promise, then the district that prepares the land in each village should not be charged to the village. In addition to the problem of village unpreparedness in providing land, there are problems related to the pecatu land dispute between the parent and expansion villages. As happened in the Suradadi parent village to the expansion village of Leming Village, the parent village of Sakra to Kuang Baru Village and South Sakra Village, the parent village of Rensing to Rensing Raya Village, West Rensing Village and the Sculpture Village and the Customary Land of Sapit Village covering an area of 1.6 hectares to the Saput Village Government, as well as Sukarara Village and Pejaring Village. Based on the results of the FGD with village heads, all villages think that the district government coerces the one village one field program. For villages that do not want to divide the pecatu land, the Regent threatens to postpone the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) disbursement (). Meanwhile, ADD is a source of fixed income (siltap) for village heads and other village officials.

DISCUSSION

Several policy issues relate to the power relationship built between the village head and the Regent during this period. This has been confirmed by various parties or informants, both from villages, districts, experts, and community groups, including *First*, campaign materials, namely one village and one field; *Second*, the policy of stopping village apparatus allowances; *Third*, the provision of financial assistance to Bumdes; and *fourth*, the implementation policy of Village Fund Allocation (ADD) and Village Fund (DD). These four issues will focus on how the power relationship between villages and districts in East Lombok Regency occurs.

Campaign Promise One Village One Field

Based on the results of interviews with the local government, the Regent's desire to present one field in the village. This is based on his concern that public facilities in the village are increasingly scarce. The location of public activities is challenging in the village due to population growth and land narrowing. Open land in the village has become rare; even what has emerged are paid public places such as futsal courts, badminton courts, and others.

The problem is where the field land comes from and whether the local government has assets in all villages in 239 villages. For example, if the need per village is (1) one hectare, then a minimum of 239 hectares of land is needed. Based on the interview results, the local government hopes to have village pecatu land/treasury land. This condition will be faced with the subject of law, namely another autonomous region, namely the village where they have the right to manage and become one of the original village registration buckets. The local government must replace or buy it even if it wants to be used for the public interest. An interesting problem is why the local government expects the village treasury land to fulfil its political promise. In contrast, the local government needs the authority to manage the village treasury land.

The problem is where the field land comes from and whether the local government has assets in all villages in 239 villages. For example, if the need per village is (1) one hectare, then a minimum of 239 hectares of land is needed. Based on the interview results, the local government hopes to have village pecatu land/treasury land. This condition will be faced with the subject of law, namely another autonomous region, namely the village where they have the right to manage and become one of the original village registration buckets. The local government must replace or buy it even if it wants to be used for the public interest. An interesting problem is why the local government expects the village treasury land to fulfil its political promise. In contrast, the local government needs the authority to manage the village treasury land.

The results of the interview with the Acting Regent, who was previously the regional secretary, stated that "the village government is part of the district government, so for this reason, the local government considers that the village is subordinate to the district and is a government unit." This statement is debatable because these two governments are each governed by their laws. This means

that normatively, the two governments stand alone, so the relationship built should be a coordinating relationship and a partner. Furthermore, an interview with the Regent of East Lombok for the 2008-2013 and 2018-2023 periods stated that "starting from the Regent, at the time of village expansion, facilities were given to meet the requirements, one of which was the preparation of the location of the village office for expansion. Especially for expansion villages that do not have a village office location, the Regent gives loans. Even when the area is purchased, the town borrows the only use. But in the end, the local government gave the land to the town as an asset. Furthermore, the Acting Regent, who was previously the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency, was also recognized that:

"Recently, the local government has given a lot of grants to villages, such as field examples which were previously managed by the district because they were considered more effective in being managed by the village and handed over through the incentive mechanism. Then another example is that village pecatu land is used for the construction of health centers, because the village government is not allowed to grant to the region, as well as the local government must not arbitrarily take the village pecatu land, so it is done by the mechanism of being bought as a replacement and or carried out by the mechanism of exchanging rolls."

(The interview results with the Acting Regent of East Lombok for 2023-2024 will be held on October 1, 2023, at 10.00-13.00 WITA at the Acting Regent's Office)

The second is the policy of the Regent in the first period of 2008-2013 to take over village assets as a result of the central policy that village heads and village officials are given fixed income from the APBD in the form of the Village Fund Allocation (ADD) program taken from the transfer of regional funds by the central government. The impact of the two policies above brought the spirit to the Regent at that time that the village was a "subordinate". Based on the argument of "services", the Regent forgot that the town was not like the village during the first period of government, namely 2008-2013, where the existence of the village, according to Law 32 of 2004, is still part of the power of the regional head is very strong.

Based on that claim, then why did the Regent in the second period make a political promise of one village, one field? Based on the results of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with the village government, local government and experts in the field of government, it was found that "the village does not need the field; what is needed more is jobs such as course institutions to prepare to support employment. Meanwhile, the village urgently needs village treasury land as an additional source of income." What was conveyed by the village head is in line with the results of research conducted by (Annahar 2016), which concluded that to achieve the welfare of the village community, what is needed is access to capital, access to transportation, savings, access to communication, the size of the house, pets, and business turnover. In addition to the facts in the field regarding the location of the village treasury land, from several cases, it was found that the village treasury land was in the main village area, and some were also in the expansion village. This condition is also a technical obstacle to realizing the mission of one village, one field. Based on a search conducted by (Sofyan Pulungan 2023), it was concluded that customary rights are a distinctive right in controlling and managing natural resources from the royal period, the Dutch colonial period, to the reform period. However, in implementing Law No. 5 of 1960 concerning Agrarian Principles (UUPA), customary land is one of the sources of social conflicts that have occurred until now.

Based on that claim, it then became the reason why the regent in the second period made a political promise of one village one field. Based on the results of *the Focus Group Discussion* (FGD) with the village government, local government and experts in the field of government, it was found that "the village does not need the field, what is needed more is jobs such as course institutions to prepare to support employment. Meanwhile, village treasury land is urgently needed by the village as an additional source of village income." (Results of FGD (focus group discussion) with participants of village heads, local governments, experts in their fields, village apparatus forum, village coconut forum, and BPD forum) What was conveyed by the village head is in line with the results of research conducted by those who concluded that to achieve the welfare of the village community, what is needed is access to capital, access to transportation, savings, access to communication, the size of the

house, pets, and business turnover. As well as the facts in the field, the location of the village treasury land, from several cases it was found that the village treasury land was in the main village area and some were also in the expansion village. This condition is also a technical obstacle to realizing the mission of one village one field. Based on the research carried out by concluding from the Dutch colonial period to the reform period that customary rights are a very distinctive right in the control and management of natural resources carried out together. However, in the practice of implementing Law No. 5 of 1960 concerning Agrarian Principles (UUPA), customary land is actually one of the sources of social conflicts that have occurred until now. (Annahar 2016) (Sofyan Pulungan 2023)

Termination of Village Apparatus Allowance

Based on the Decree (SK) of the Regent of East Lombok Regency No: 188.45/718/PMD/2019 concerning the Determination of Fixed Income Allowances, Village Fund Allocation (ADD), and Revenue Sharing of Regional Taxes and Regional Levies in 2020 in East Lombok Regency. The decision received a reaction from the village apparatus through PPDI (Indonesian Village Apparatus Association) because it abolished the village apparatus allowance. After all, the village apparatus's salary was by the Regency Minimum Wage (UMK), so the allowance was abolished, 400,000 to 450,000/month. Based on the results of the interview, the Head of the Village Government Empowerment Office of East Lombok Regency stated that another reason is the increasing number of village officials who need to be paid as a result of the expansion of villages and hamlets so that it dramatically affects the APBD because if it is relocated, it requires a budget of around Rp.15 billion/year (Results of an interview with the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency with the Head of the PMD Office in the Regional Secretary's Office on October 1, 2023, at 10.00 WITA).

The termination of allowances under the pretext of having many salary instruments and the number of officials who must be paid is contrary to the rules regarding the allowances of village officials. According to the provisions, the allowance for village officials is taken from the APBDes and sourced from the original village income (PADes). The local government has the authority to regulate the allowance of the village apparatus instead of determining the amount to be paid because the determination of the allowance is adjusted to the ability of the village through the original income. In several interviews with the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency, he stated diplomatically that "the allowance of the village apparatus is not dismissed but returned to the village to pay according to the original income of the village, but on the one hand, he questioned whether the village has the ability or not because the average village in East Lombok district is still very dependent on the APBDes from DD and ADD and government assistance." From this statement, the Regional Secretary still questioned the ability of the village to be independent in paying the Village Apparatus allowance.

On the one hand, the policy was taken as an impact of the local government's power on villages, which are considered state apparatuses under its control. If that is the understanding, there will be a gap in the local government's knowledge of the village's existence as a formalized local community. Villages and regions come with different laws, even though they are interrelated. Local governments exist based on Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional and Village Governments based on Law Number 6 2014 concerning Villages. If studied normatively in Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government in village provisions, it is only mentioned in one chapter, namely chapter XVIII, articles 371 to 372, and no articles or paragraphs explicitly regulating village apparatus. The village apparatus is controlled in Law Number 6 of 2014 in the fifth part of articles 48 to 53. In one of the articles, it is stated that (2) the Village Apparatus, as referred to in paragraph (1), is appointed by the Village Head after consulting with the Sub-district Head on behalf of the Regent/Mayor. This provision firmly states that village heads appoint and dismiss village officials after consulting with the sub-district head. This provision can be read as the village apparatus being the village head's domain, even if the local government's role through the sub-district head is limited to consultation to provide consideration, not approval.

Regarding the position of authority related to village apparatus, there has indeed been an, e.g. between Law Number 6 of 2014 and Permendagri Number 67 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Permendagri Number 83 of 2015. Regarding this problem, one of the village heads conducted a

material test for the Constitutional Court (MK). Still, it was rejected because the application for the wrong address should have gone to the Supreme Court (MA) due to the conflict of norms between the Minister of Home Affairs and the law. The village head, Belly Respati (Applicant), tested Article 5, paragraph (6) of the Permendagri Village Apparatus contrary to Article 26, paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the Village Law. Article 5, paragraph (6) of the Permendagri of the Village Apparatus states, *"The written recommendation of the sub-district head or other designations as referred to in paragraph (5) is based on the requirements for the dismissal of the village apparatus."* Article 26, paragraph (1) of the Village Law states, *"The Village Head is in charge of organizing Village Government, carrying out Village Development, fostering village communities and empowering village communities."* Article 26 paragraph (2) of the Village Law Village Law, *"In carrying out the duties as intended in paragraph (1), the Village Head is authorized to: a. lead the implementation of the Village Government; b. appoint and dismiss village officials."*

The local government has understood Article 5 paragraph (6) of the Permendagri that the Village Apparatus is a matter of the government above it (the state) through the local government to regulate all things, including salaries and allowances. Thus, the position of the village and the local government is not as a partner but as a superior and subordinate; the impact of the ambivalent position of the apparatus between the village apparatus as a community and the village apparatus in the co-optation of the state with the obligation to dress like civil servants and working hours like civil servants (Wasistiono, 2019). Meanwhile, the purpose of the Village Law is to strengthen the position of the village with its community, local community government, independence, customs, or what is often referred to as exercising rights based on origin (recognition) and rights on a local scale (subordination). This means that the policy of eliminating allowances for village officials is a policy of "failing to understand" the local government's actual position of the village. The policy received a tap reaction from the village apparatus through their association, namely PPDI (Indonesian Village Apparatus Association). Their response was to oppose the Regent's policy because it had reduced the income of the village apparatus.

Article 5 paragraph (6) of the Permendagri seems to have been understood by the local government that the Village Apparatus is a matter of the government above it (the state) through the local government to regulate all things including salaries and allowances. Thus, the position of the village and the local government is not as a partner but as a superior and subordinate, the impact of the ambiguous position of the apparatus between the village apparatus as a community and the village apparatus in the co-optation of the state with the obligation to dress like civil servants and working hours like civil servants. Meanwhile, the purpose of the Village Law is to strengthen the position of the village with its community, local community government, independence, customs, or what is often referred to as exercising rights based on origin (recognition) and rights on a local scale (subordination). This means that the policy of eliminating allowances for village officials is a policy of "failing to understand" the local government's actual position of the village. The policy received a tap reaction from the village apparatus through the association they formed, namely PPDI (Indonesian Village Apparatus Association). Their reaction was to oppose what was the regent's policy because it had reduced the income of the village apparatus. (Wasistiono 2019)

One of the situations in the village is the need for more professionalism of village officials, one of the effects of the lack of attention to the human resource aspect. The resource in question is the quality of the village apparatus that is urgently needed in the framework of improving services to the village community; instead of improving the quality of the village, what happens is to weaken the bargaining position of the town when dealing with the power above it. This condition is explained based on the results of research conducted by (Boel Ngaji; Patar Rumapea; Soni Rompas 2016) concluded that the quality of village apparatus is still low.

One of the situations that occurs in the village is the lack of professionalism of village officials, one of the effects of the lack of attention to the human resource aspect. The resource in question is the quality of the village apparatus that is urgently needed in the framework of improving services to the village community, instead of improving the quality of the village, what happens is to weaken the bargaining

position of the village when dealing with the power above it. This condition is explained based on the results of research conducted by concluding that the quality of village apparatus is still low. (Boel Ngaji; Patar Rumapea; Soni Rompas 2016)

Provision of Financial Assistance to Bumdes

One of the regulatory breakthroughs in Law Number 6 of 2016 is the issue of Village-Owned Enterprises (BUMDes). BUMDes is one of the agencies instrumental in building economic strength in the village. It was known as the Village Unit Cooperative (KUD) during the New Order period. Still, its management was full of nepotism or kinship, so KUD only enriched certain parties. BUMDes is intended to facilitate and direct the economic potentials in the village through a professionally managed BUMDes economic institution, which will ultimately contribute to the Village's Original Income itself, and the hope is to increase the financial independence of the village to manage operational funds. By Government Regulation Number 11 of 2021 concerning Village-Owned Enterprises Article 47:

Village BUM/Joint Village BUM can receive assistance from the Central Government, Regional Government, and other non-binding parties;

Assistance as intended in paragraph (1) becomes an Asset of BUM Village/BUM Village Together;

Assistance from the Central Government and Regional Governments, as referred to in paragraph (1), is distributed directly to the Village BUM/Village BUM together and is implemented by the provisions of laws and regulations;

As referred to in paragraph (1), assistance from other parties is distributed directly to the Village BUM/Joint Village BUM. It is carried out at any time by the parties' agreement with the Village BUM/Joint Village BUM.

Based on the above provisions, local governments can assist non-binding BUMDes. Non-binding means that a specific commitment or reward does not accompany the assistance. The provision of aid to BUMDes in East Lombok Regency, as reported in the media quoted from (Ali, 2020) the provision of capital assistance to BUMDes is to encourage BUMDes to be active in distributing the Non-Cash Assistance Program (PBNT) to the community in the form of predetermined necessities type and amount (Inside, 2020b). According to the existing tenancy that the provision of assistance to BUMDes is not binding, the meaning is that the provision of the aid is not given any frills for what but is ultimately the recipient's right to be used for the development of BUMDes itself. In other words, the provision of assistance is not for a specific purpose of the district, so the requirements for assisting are not objective, and the requirements of particular interests are, for example, villages are loyalists of the Regent or because they are critical to the local government. The provision of assistance from the regions is capital assistance, so it can help BUMDesa capital carry out economic activities that increase the village's original income. Another problem is that out of the 239 existing villages, only 20 villages have been assisted, causing jealousy from the other 219 villages (Andita, 2025). The 22 (Twenty villages) are BUMDes Suela, Masbagik Utara Baru, Setanggor, Kembang Kuning, Suela, Gunung Rajak, Sugian, Labuhan Lombok, and Pringgasela. Then Pasenggrihan, Wanasaba Lauk, Presak, Pandan Wangi, Korleko, Senyur, South Kelayu, Surabaya, Slagek, Dasan Borok, and Sajang (Taken from (Inside, 2020a) on Thursday, March 7, 2024 at 14.33 WITA). Based on the results of the interview with the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency stated that "the assistance is a trigger for a form of commitment by the regent so that the villages are more enthusiastic in building Bumdes for the progress of the village and the community". The trigger is intended for certain villages with various considerations, one of which is the level of health and readiness of Bumdes in management. The hope is that Bumdes that do not accept can be used as a source of inspiration for good examples in the management of Bumdes. Besides that, it is also hoped that the village will be more enthusiastic about running the economic wheels in the village (Results of an interview with the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency with the Head of the PMD Office of East Lombok Regency). Of the 239 (Two Hundred and Three Puuh Nine) villages, all have BUMDes,

and all have the potential to distribute the Non-Cash Assistance Program to other residents. Still, the fact is that the villages given have the same health level in managing their BUMDes.

The power relationship based on the policy of the Regent of East Lombok to assist 20 villages is a form of dominant relationship because the giving is carried out in not all villages, causing jealousy from other villages. Meanwhile, among the villages, they tell each other's stories and know each other's conditions so that the villages that cannot consider that the Regent's policy is full of the proximity of the client's patron as a form of reward for support for the Regent when nominating him and making him re-elected. Interestingly, as the leading sector, the Village Community Empowerment Office needed to learn about the provision of funds to the BUMDes based on a statement from one of the heads of the fields who did not want to be identified.

One of the instruments of power in the village to strengthen the town's position is the BPD (People's Consultative Body). However, in reality, BPD does not have the power to face local government policies because they need regional policies. In addition to their incompetence, it is also because the design of the existence of BPD based on existing regulations is no longer chosen but appointed. Before Law No. 32 of 2004, based on Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government, BPD was selected to be called the Village Representative Body.

The village is the lowest power entity supported by laws and regulations as recognition of village autonomy. The capital is used to build new awareness for the village and strengthen its position through *its bargaining position* with the district. This awareness is institutionalized based on professions in the formation of organizations/associations, including the Village Head Communication Forum (FKKD), Communication Forum of the Village Consultative Body (FKBPD), Indonesian Village Apparatus Association (PPDI); and nationally formed Indonesian Village Government Association (APDESI).

In particular, FKKD and FKBPD in East Lombok Regency are sufficient to oversee village policies. This is evident from several recent policies that are detrimental to the village, which are consistently communicated by forum facilitation both through hearings and even demonstrations. Based on the results of an interview with the chairman of the BPD forum (Judan Surabaya), the presence of the BPD forum, in addition to strengthening the role of BPD in the village, is also to accommodate various interests of BPD to be communicated with the local government and the central government. The same thing was also conveyed by the chairman of the Village Head Forum (M. Khairul Ihsan) that the existence of the Forum aims to advocate, protect, and protect all members of the Forum, including making innovations in building synergy with various parties.

In addition to the institution within the village, there is also a massive new force in the town with various civil *society forces* such as youth associations, arts, NGOs, mass organizations and others. The power of *civil society* forms strength by collaborating with the government, both village, district and even provincial governments. In addition, the increasing openness of public space and political access in the town also adds ammunition for them to build connections as a successful team and be active in government programs such as village assistants, PKH, and others. This kind of awareness has become a new strength in the village, so the district must reconstruct the relationship that will be built with the town.

Model of Power Relations for Village Partnership and Village Supra

With the enactment of the village law, the model of power relations for village partnerships and village supra villages now occupies a strategic position. Strategic means that village development is the primary strategy for achieving the goals and ideals of the founders of this country. Strong, independent, democratic, and prosperous villages throughout the archipelago will ensure the sustainable achievement of the ideals of the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia will become strong, independent, democratic, prosperous, and socially just when its villages throughout Indonesia also achieve firm, independent, democratic, and prosperous conditions and social justice for all villagers. (Heru Cahyono 2020)

Villages with the enactment of the Village Law now occupy a strategic position. Strategic means that village development is the main strategy for achieving the goals and ideals of the founders of this country. Strong, independent, democratic, and prosperous villages throughout the archipelago will ensure the sustainable achievement of the ideals of the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia will become strong, independent, democratic, and prosperous, and socially just when its villages throughout Indonesia also achieve strong, independent, democratic, and prosperous conditions, and social justice for all villagers. (Heru Cahyono 2020)

Based on the existing laws and regulations in Indonesia, the government under the sub-district has three villages, customary villages, and outings. The three forms of government have their characteristics but cannot be distinguished functionally. The power relationship between villages and customary villages or other designations with the state has meaning because it is very high to maintain the integrity of the Indonesian nation and state. Formulating the power relationship that is built requires serious attention and has a long-term dimension. With the trend of the existence of villages today in the state power structure, the actors of power have enough influence so that the state begins to arrange according to the needs and conditions of villages in Indonesia. The pattern of relations built by the state does not affirm/negate the peculiarities owned by villages, customary villages, or other names. The characteristics of villages in Indonesia are very plural/diverse; that argument is the basis for why villages in Indonesia cannot be treated uniformly by the state. Diversity is one of the most significant contributors to the character of the nation and state in Indonesia. Eliminating differences is the same as eliminating the Indonesian state as a great nation with extraordinary differences. Ultimately, the diverse characteristics of villages have the most profound meaning in managing power relations in Indonesia.

According to the partnership theory, the primary key to a constructive relationship is an effective partnership characterized by the existence of factors of trust, respect, intense communication, vision, and togetherness, as well as cultural sensitivity so that they can make mutually beneficial decisions together (Blue-Banning et al. 2004). Partnerships with profit-oriented collaborators are based on accepting shared responsibility, recognizing the importance of community, and developing a sense of community (Horn and Kerasidou 2020). Formatively, the partnership power relationship can be described as shown in the image below.





Figure 2. Reconstruction of Village Power Relations and Village Supra

Why is the partnership power relationship model that needs to be developed between villages and districts/supra villages because each has the same resources, structure, and goals, namely realizing the state mission of the Republic of Indonesia for the welfare and welfare of the community? In addition, as illustrated by the image above, villages and districts are governed by different laws and have a power infrastructure that is almost equally different in the area of their power range. The explanation is more straightforward, as depicted in the image below.



Building More than building a partnership power relationship is required with the power of regulation, but based on findings in the field, the leadership style of a regent is very influential. For example, during the 2013-2018 Regent period, the villages felt a very large atmosphere of partiality to village independence because the town's role was greatly maximized in managing needs. Meanwhile, during the Regent period of 2008-2013 and 2018-2023, it felt that many programs were "dedicated", and there was even emphasis until threats such as Village Funds were withheld, village apparatus allowances were eliminated, and village apparatus was treated like regional apparatus.

This leadership style creates a dynamic power relationship between the village and the supra-village. Still, a standard must be used as a benchmark in building power relations. The Regent practised this leadership style for the 2013-2018 period so that the village heads felt his leadership was by the village. Transactional is a leadership style that directs more subordinates and strict control, then rewards those who succeed and gives *punishment* for violators (punishment and reward). The Regent predominantly carries out this leadership style for the 2008-2013 and 2018-2023 periods. The frequent statements to the village evidence this; for example, for the parent village that has not divided the town's land, the allocation of village funds is withheld, and so are others.

CONCLUSION

Dynamics of village and district power relations in the realm of village expansion policy in East Lombok Regency. It can be concluded that three relationships occur, namely the dominant power relationship, the interdependence power relationship, and the power relationship that is influenced by the leadership style of the regional head or Regent. *First*, the relationship of domination power is evident when the village faces the district. Villages can accept the district's decisions based on various rules from the central government, provinces, and districts. With more and more village obligations to the district, among others, the obligation to follow the technical instructions issued by the district in all respects, the village is really under the regulatory siege of both the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of PDT, the Ministry of Finance; The obligation to submit financial reports and the

implementation of village government to the Regent through the sub-district. In other words, the village becomes a state (a village representing the state) and nationalization with a pattern of hegemonic power relations through political-economic transactions and synergy of statism, *voluntary exchange*, and intimacy. *Second*, the power relationship between village and district heads is influenced by transactional leadership patterns. The interdependent relationship can be seen; on the one hand, the village has the original autonomy of the village, while on the other hand, it is faced with regional autonomy. These two positions are ambiguous, both interpreting autonomy in their respective perspectives. This ambiguity impacts the ambiguity of the relationship built between villages and districts. The district is above and has power over the village, so with its authority, it makes various policies in which the village is the last estuary in its implementation.

On the one hand, villages with their autonomy have authority based on their origin/traditional rights and a local scale. *The third* is the leadership style of the regions/regents, comparing two regents with NGO backgrounds and business people with the military and bureaucrats. Regional heads with backgrounds such as NGO buses, business people, and even academics have different views on village government. Villages can be insignificant in number because the impact is to create new conflicts and give rise to new interests. The most important thing is that the existing villages are more advanced and competitive in support of the district government. Meanwhile, the Regent with a military background uses a command system and gives the impression that the village is a subordinate who must receive orders from superiors/districts. This condition can be seen from several policies implemented, including imposing the One Village, One Field program taken from village pecatu land and the policy of terminating village apparatus allowances.

The partnership power relationship is the solution to the mutually beneficial power relations between villages and districts. The district does not negate the village's original autonomy. The increasing dynamism of society has an impact on strengthening awareness to group themselves in formal and informal institutional organizations. This alternative power relationship provides a competitive and constructive space for the village to continue to develop in the framework of improving the community's quality of life. Awareness of the formation of associations according to the government profession in the village, such as the Village Head Communication Forum (FKKD), the BPD Communication Forum, the Village Apparatus Communication Forum (FKPD), and at the national level, there is an association of the Indonesian Village Government Association (APDESI). Associations that have sprung up at the village level, especially in East Lombok Regency, are quite colourful, especially in fighting for the aspirations of the village government. Apart from the exclusive issue that is fought, at the policy level, the institution's position is reasonably considered, primarily related to the welfare of its members. Rejections of regional policies include terminating village apparatus allowances because they already have a fixed salary (Siltap) and others. Meanwhile, the provision that it can be paid as long as the APBDes can pay it and the rejection of the delay in realising ADD.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, Zahra, Anushka Ataullahjan, Michelle F. Gaffey, Mohamed Osman, Chantal Umutoni, Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, and Abdirisak A. Dalmar. 2020. "Understanding the Factors Affecting the Humanitarian Health and Nutrition Response for Women and Children in Somalia since 2000: A Case Study." *Conflict and Health* 14(1): 1–15. doi:10.1186/s13031-019-0241-x.
- Akadun, Akadun. 2024. "Analysis of Pseudo-Decentralization and Financial Dependency in the Implementation of Regional Autonomy in Sumedang Regency of Indonesia." *Public Policy and Administration* 23(1): 9–22. doi:10.5755/j01.ppaa.23.1.33295.
- Ash-Shidiqqi, Ellectrananda Anugerah, and Hindrawan Wibisono. 2018. "Corruption and Village: Accountability of Village Fund Management on Preventing Corruption (Problems and Challenges)." *Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies* 3(2): 195–212. doi:10.15294/jils.v3i02.27524.

- Aspinall, Edward, and Noor Rohman. 2017. "Village Head Elections in Java: Money Politics and Brokerage in the Remaking of Indonesia's Rural Elite." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 48(1): 31–52. doi:10.1017/S0022463416000461.
- Blue-Banning, Martha, Jean Ann Summers, H. Corine Frankland, Louise Lord Nelson, and Gwen Beegle. 2004. "Dimensions of Family and Professional Partnerships: Constructive Guidelines for Collaboration." *Exceptional Children* 70(2): 167–84. doi:10.1177/001440290407000203.
- Boursaw, Blake, John G. Oetzel, Elizabeth Dickson, Thomas S. Thein, Shannon Sanchez-Youngman, Juan Peña, Myra Parker, et al. 2021. "Scales of Practices and Outcomes for Community-Engaged Research." *American Journal of Community Psychology* 67(3–4): 256–70. doi:10.1002/ajcp.12503.
- Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 2002. "Government-Nonprofit Partnership: A Defining Framework." *Public Administration and Development* 22(1): 19–30. doi:10.1002/pad.203.
- Das, Jishnu, Benjamin Daniels, Monisha Ashok, Eun Young Shim, and Karthik Muralidharan. 2022. "Two Indias: The Structure of Primary Health Care Markets in Rural Indian Villages with Implications for Policy." *Social Science and Medicine* 301(November 2019): 112799. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.112799.
- Diehlmann, Florian, Markus Lüttenberg, Lotte Verdonck, Marcus Wiens, Alexander Zienau, and Frank Schultmann. 2021. "Public-Private Collaborations in Emergency Logistics: A Framework Based on Logistical and Game-Theoretical Concepts." *Safety Science* 141(August 2020): 105301. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2021.105301.
- Fatmawati, Fatmawati, Nuryanti Mustari, Haerana Haerana, Risma Niswaty, and Abdillah Abdillah. 2022. "Waste Bank Policy Implementation through Collaborative Approach: Comparative Study—Makassar and Bantaeng, Indonesia." *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 14(13). doi:10.3390/su14137974.
- Fitriani, E., Hofman, B., & Kaiser, K. 2005. "The Politics of Decentralization in Indonesia: A Review of the Literature." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 1.
- Guest, David, Angela Knox, and Chris Warhurst. 2022. "Humanizing Work in the Digital Age: Lessons from Socio-Technical Systems and Quality of Working Life Initiatives." *Human Relations* 75(8): 1461–82. doi:10.1177/00187267221092674.
- Hall, Jill, Megan Freund, Joshua Dizon, Robert Sanson-Fisher, and Balakrishnan R. Nair. 2024. "Living the Dream-Housing Perceptions and Quality of Life of Older People Living in Manufactured Home Villages." *Journal of Aging and Environment* 0(0): 1–12. doi:10.1080/26892618.2024.2389530.
- Horn, Ruth, and Angeliki Kerasidou. 2020. "Sharing Whilst Caring: Solidarity and Public Trust in a Data-Driven Healthcare System." *BMC Medical Ethics* 21(1): 1–7. doi:10.1186/s12910-020-00553-8.
- Kamuli, Fahmi, Tunggul Anshari, and Istislam. 2021. "Regional Head's Authority in Determining Work Placement Due to Mutations of Government Employees." *Jambura Law Review* 3(1): 37–54. doi:10.33756/jlr.v3i1.7520.
- Kulkarni, Vani S. 2012. "The Making and Unmaking of Local Democracy in an Indian Village." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 642(1): 152–69. doi:10.1177/0002716212438207.
- Kushandajani, and Laila Kholid Alfirdaus. 2019. "Women's Empowerment in Village Governance Transformation in Indonesia: Between Hope and Criticism." *International Journal of Rural Management* 15(1): 137–57. doi:10.1177/0973005219836576.

- Listiana, I., and D. Ariyanto. 2024. "Structural Equation Modeling for Social Capital Empowerment in Supporting Mangrove Rehabilitation." *Global Journal of Environmental Science and Management* 10(4): 2031–44. doi:10.22034/gjesm.2024.04.32.
- Maisyaroh, Juharyanto, Ibrahim Bafadal, Bambang Budi Wiyono, Nova Syafira Ariyanti, Maulana Amirul Adha, and Muhammad Imran Qureshi. 2021. "The Principals' Efforts in Facilitating the Freedom to Learn by Enhancing Community Participation in Indonesia." *Educational Horizon* 40(1): 196–207. doi:10.21831/cp.v40i1.36119.
- Matthew B. Miles; A. Michael Huberman. 1994. "An Expanded Sourcebook Qualitative Data Analysis." *SAGE publication International Education and Professional Publisher Thousand Oaks*. Vol. II. L.
- Murdoch, Blake. 2021. "Privacy and Artificial Intelligence: Challenges for Protecting Health Information in a New Era." *BMC Medical Ethics* 22(1): 1–5. doi:10.1186/s12910-021-00687-3.
- Rodiyah, Rodiyah. 2018. "Reformation of the Administration of Village Government in Indonesia Based on Law Number 6 of 2014 on Villages (Comparing Normative and Empirical Facts on Villagers Participation)." 192(6): 264–69. doi:10.2991/icils-18.2018.50.
- Rondinelli, D. A., & Nellis, J. R. 2006. "Assessing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Indonesia." *World Development* 1.
- Sahrina, Alfi, Muhammad Sainul Fadlan, Febrian Arrya Withuda, Mohammad Ainul Labib, Dwi Fitriani, and Naqia Min Ma'Asika. 2022. "Elaborative Analysis of Caves As Specified Tourism Destination in Malang Regency – Indonesia." *Geojournal of Tourism and Geosites* 41(2): 368–75. doi:10.30892/gtg.41205-839.
- Shams, Fatemeh. 2018. "The Village in Contemporary Persian Poetry." *Iranian Studies* 51(3): 455–77. doi:10.1080/00210862.2018.1431045.
- Skarsaune, Synne Nese, Halvor Hanisch, and Anita Gjermestad. 2021. "Self-Determination: What Can We Learn from Persons with Profound Intellectual and Multiple Disabilities?" *Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research* 23(1): 317–27. doi:10.16993/SJDR.830.
- Sørensen, Kristine, Diane Levin-Zamir, Tuyen V. Duong, Orkan Okan, Virginia Visconde Brasil, and Don Nutbeam. 2021. "Building Health Literacy System Capacity: A Framework for Health Literate Systems." *Health Promotion International* 36: 113–23. doi:10.1093/heapro/daab153.
- Srimulyani, Veronika Agustini, and Yustinus Budi Hermanto. 2022. "Impact of Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy and Entrepreneurial Motivation on Micro and Small Business Success for Food and Beverage Sector in East Java, Indonesia." *Economies* 10(1). doi:10.3390/economies10010010.
- Sutikno, A. Yahya Surya Winata, Muhlis Tahir, and Hery Purwanto. 2024. "Sustainable Development Strategy Based on Value-Added in the Fisheries Sector: Study on the Kangean Islands, Sumenep Regency, Indonesia." *Journal of Lifestyle and SDG'S Review* 4(2): 1–31. doi:10.47172/2965-730X.SDGsReview.v4.n02.pe01791.
- Tobing, Murniati, Sya'ad Afifuddin, Rahmanta Ginting, and Raina Linda Sari. 2024. "Evaluating Community Welfare Effects of the Tourism Development on Geopark Caldera Toba." *Journal of Ecohumanism* 3(3): 1667–78. doi:10.62754/joe.v3i3.3630.
- Wang, Yan. 2021. "Government Policies, National Culture and Social Distancing during the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic: International Evidence." *Safety Science* 135(December 2020): 105138. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2020.105138.
- Wong, Siu Wai, Bo Sin Tang, and Jinlong Liu. 2020. "Village Elections, Grassroots Governance and the Restructuring of State Power: An Empirical Study in Southern Peri-Urban China." *China Quarterly* 241(August 2019): 22–42. doi:10.1017/S0305741019000808.

- Wu, Haitao, Yunwei Li, Yu Hao, Siyu Ren, and Pengfei Zhang. 2020. "Environmental Decentralization, Local Government Competition, and Regional Green Development: Evidence from China." *Science of the Total Environment* 708: 135085. doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.135085.
- Yasinta, Frita, and Ulul Hidayah. 2024. "Analysis of Effectiveness of Health Facilities Services in Magelang Regency, Indonesia." *Planning Malaysia* 22(4): 329–43. doi:10.21837/pm.v22i33.1552.
- Youm, Yoosik, Ekaterina Baldina, and Jiwon Baek. 2021. "All-Cause Mortality and Three Aspects of Social Relationships: An Eight-Year Follow-up of Older Adults from One Entire Korean Village." *Scientific Reports* 11(1): 1–11. doi:10.1038/s41598-020-80684-5.
- Yusri, Ali, Tito Handoko, and Mohammad Yohamzy Tiyas Tinov. 2022. "Government Collaboration in Peat Ecosystem Governance in Meranti Islands Regency, Riau Province-Indonesia." *International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning* 17(7): 2123–30. doi:10.18280/ijstdp.170712.